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The past decade has seen a flowering of highly creative schol-
arship in labor history and labor law. Although scholars in these
two disciplines occasionally refer to each other, their work has pro-
ceeded largely along independent lines. Yet these lines have been
parallel, if unconnected. Much scholarship in both disciplines has
been informed by revitalized traditions of radical analysis that
have influenced a new generation educated in the late 1960s and
early 1970s.
Born in 1951, Christopher L. Tomlins is part of this new gen-
eration. In The State and the Unions, he combines an excellent
synthesis of recent work in labor history and labor law with a stim-
ulating account of the debate in the 1930s over state intervention
in labor relations. His analysis of the New Deal, based on original
archival research, reveals key developments within the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) and the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). Readers interested in these subjects will be fasci-
nated by his important and well-written book.
I. AN OVERVIEW
The State and the Unions is much more than a presentation
of original research and a useful synthesis of history and law. Iden-
t Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law.
I appreciate the thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this review by William
Forbath, Patrick Gudridge, Laura Kalman, Stanley Katz, Karl Klare, and David Silberman.
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tifying with the new radical critique of the liberal state, Tomlins
attacks the "self-congratulatory complacency" of the theory of "in-
dustrial pluralism" that has dominated American labor scholarship
since World War II (p. xii). 1 Industrial pluralists view the Ameri-
can system of labor law, especially the National Labor Relations
Act 2 (NLRA) that stands as its centerpiece, as a brilliantly effec-
tive way of solving the conflicts between labor and management in
an atmosphere that promotes industrial peace, stability, and
democracy.
Tomlins, in contrast, argues that the American state, largely
through its legal institutions, has conditioned the legitimacy of la-
bor activity and collective bargaining on their effectiveness as
"means to higher productivity and efficient capital accumulation"
(p. xiii). Like the radical theorists on whom he relies,3 Tomlins re-
jects a conspiratorial or instrumental model of the impact of busi-
ness elites on the law. He does not believe that corporate capital-
ists consciously attempted to co-opt the American working class by
engineering the passage of the NLRA. Nor, however, does Tomlins
view the law as a formal and autonomous system uninfluenced by
business interests. Rather, he accepts the increasingly prevalent
radical concept of the "relative autonomy" of the state and its law
from corporate capitalism. According to Tomlins, law-the lan-
guage of the state-mirrors and helps reproduce the dominant po-
litical and economic system. The law is sufficiently autonomous to
permit results inconsistent with the immediate interests of capital-
ists, but it is this very autonomy that enables law to be especially
effective in preserving the capitalist system. Tomlins views the re-
lationship and tensions between the state and the unions as a con-
crete example of the relative autonomy of law (pp. xii-xiv), al-
though he does not elaborate explicitly either the theory or the
operation of this concept after he introduces it in his preface.
Tomlins argues that the NLRA, while more favorable to work-
ers and unions than prior law, continued the "contingent legiti-
All parenthetical page references are to Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the
Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960
(1985).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1982) (adopted in 1935).
3Tomlins cites Nicos Poulantzas and Fred Block as writers who have influenced his
theoretical views (p. xiii). See, e.g., Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes
(1973); Fred Block, The Ruling Class Does Not Rule, 33 Socialist Revolution 6 (1977); Fred
Block, Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subjects, in Ralph Mili-
band and John Saville, eds., Social Register 227 (1980). Tomlins also incorporates perspec-
tives from Isaac Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the 'Relative Au-
tonomy' of the Law, 11 Law & Society Rev. 571 (1977).
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macy of collective labor action [that] has been a constant theme of
the development, over the last hundred years, of a corporate capi-
talist polity in the United States" (p. xiii). He sadly concludes that
labor's reliance on the state, and particularly on the NLRA and its
subsequent interpretation by the NLRB and the courts, has pro-
duced a "counterfeit liberty" for workers and unions that may be
"ultimately no more than the opportunity to participate in the
construction of their own subordination" (pp. 326-28).
Oddly, Tomlins's conclusion is echoed in recent statements by
Lane Kirkland, the President of the AFL-CIO. Criticizing deci-
sions in which an NLRB dominated by appointees of President
Reagan overturned precedents more favorable to labor interests,
Kirkland has angrily and defiantly asserted that the American la-
bor movement would be better off operating outside the legal
framework established by the NLRA.4 The State and the Unions
makes clear that Kirkland's comments, though shocking to many
of his contemporaries shaped by the ideology of industrial plural-
ism, invoke a venerable tradition of labor voluntarism. This tradi-
tion, which rejected any role for the state in labor relations and
stressed the importance of collective activity by workers, existed
throughout American history before being submerged by labor's re-
liance on the NLRA. Indeed, AFL leaders in the 1930s worried
that the NLRA would threaten the principle of voluntarism and
produce precisely the debilitating effects that Kirkland and Tom-
lins now lament. These AFL leaders resisted provisions of the pro-
posed legislation, as well as many subsequent NLRB interpreta-
tions of the Act, that they believed were at odds with traditional
union voluntarism.5
Tomlins is particularly effective in examining the debate over
voluntarism in the context of the NLRB's definition of an appro-
priate bargaining unit for union representation. Through his crea-
tive integration of original research with theoretical analysis, he
has infused new excitement into what had previously been a rather
technical subject. Tomlins argues that by giving the NLRB, a state
agency, the discretion to determine the appropriate bargaining
unit, the NLRA destroyed the previous power of unions to decide
" Cathy Trost and Leonard Apear, AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor Laws A "Dead Letter,"
Wall St. J. 8 (Aug. 16, 1984).
' The AFL nevertheless supported the NLRA enthusiastically (p. 141). Yet similar sus-
picions about government intervention in labor relations led some groups on the left, such
as the Communist Party of the United States and the American Civil Liberties Union, to
oppose the NLRA. See Cletus E. Daniel, The ACLU and the Wagner Act (1980).
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for themselves where and how to organize. Most prior radical criti-
ques of modern American labor law have asserted that the NLRA
has been undermined by unnecessarily and sometimes unjustifiably
restrictive decisions of the NLRB and the courts.6 Tomlins sug-
gests, in contrast, that by encouraging reliance on the law and the
state as a substitute for the tradition of labor voluntarism, the pas-
sage of the statute itself doomed the American worker. Rather
than speculating about how a different interpretation of the NLRA
might have produced more progressive results, Tomlins contends
that the position of workers deteriorated when they allowed law to
replace voluntarism as the means of achieving their aspirations.
By contrasting labor voluntarism with reliance on the state,
Tomlins suggests his own answer to the familiar and fundamental
debate about why a more radical labor tradition did not emerge in
the United States. He clearly believes that workers' reliance on the
state essentially precluded more radical possibilities. Regrettably,
however, Tomlins does not reflect on whether it would have been
possible to preserve a successful version of labor voluntarism dur-
ing and after the New Deal. His almost exclusive focus on the law
in the period beginning with the New Deal prevents him from
making a convincing argument that reliance on the state has been
the major factor inhibiting the realization of a more radical vision
of labor relations.
Many factors other than the law help explain the current posi-
tion of unions and workers in American society. But Tomlins
barely refers to them; he fails to examine sufficiently the relation-
ships between law and society or the ways in which law is both
relative and autonomous. The creative synthesis of legal and his-
torical materials that Tomlins applies so effectively to his analysis
of the nineteenth century is strangely missing from his account of
labor relations beginning with the New Deal, the primary subject
of his book and the focus of his original research. His discussion of
purely legal doctrine, moreover, is marred by his failure to ac-
knowledge any significant respect in which contemporary interpre-
tation of the NLRA has or could have helped workers and unions.
An effective demonstration of the relative autonomy of law in
the context of contemporary American labor relations would have
required a different book than the one Tomlins wrote. The book he
did write cannot sustain the ambitious theoretical conclusions that
6 See James B. Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law (1983); Karl
E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1978).
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he summarily presents in his preface and final chapter. Yet this
book does demonstrate the value of integrating recent radical
scholarship in labor law and labor history and illustrates, through
its highly original and effective analysis of the debate over the ap-
propriate bargaining unit, the dangers of reliance on the state and
the weaknesses of industrial pluralism.
II. A FUSION OF HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
Tomlins begins his book by relating several familiar develop-
ments. He describes the growth of the corporation and of its con-
trol over workers; the changing legal status of the corporation from
a creature of the state, regulated in the public interest, to an au-
tonomous entity with the rights and privileges of a natural person;
the extent of labor unrest in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries; and the hostility of the law to union goals and activi-
ties-from application of the theory of criminal conspiracy to the
development and widespread use of the labor injunction. Drawing
on recent scholarship by labor historians, Tomlins also contrasts
the increasingly incompatible interpretations, offered by employers
and journeymen workers, of the republican heritage of the Ameri-
can Revolution. Whereas employers appealed to notions of liberty
and independence to justify entrepreneurial freedom from re-
straints, journeymen argued that the virtuous society for which the
Revolution had been fought required enough substantive equality
to guarantee economic and social independence for all citizens. In-
fluenced by the associational traditions of their trades, the jour-
neymen reinterpreted revolutionary ideology in largely collective
terms (pp. 34-36).
Brilliantly integrating the conclusions of these historians with
his analysis of the developing law, Tomlins observes that the indi-
vidualism of entrepreneurial republicanism fed into the emerging
legal doctrine of criminal conspiracy. Collective efforts by journey-
men to regulate labor and wages sufficiently to preserve meaning-
ful independence became, according to this legal doctrine, an at-
tack against the individual rights of employers and other
See especially Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City & the Rise of the
American Working Class, 1788-1850 at 14-15, 94-96, 141-42, 220, 242-48, 296 (1984); Sean
Wilentz, Artisan Republican Festivals and the Rise of Class Conflict in New York City,
1788-1837, in Michael H. Frisch and Daniel J. Walkowitz, eds., Working-Class America 37,
37-38, 49-53, 60-61, 64-65 (1983); Eric Foner, Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil
War 58-59 (1980). William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law
in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 767, traces the growing divergence of these interpreta-
tions of republicanism from the Reconstruction era until the 1890s.
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journeymen to contract freely with each other. In an extremely
original and provocative interpretation of the famous labor law
case, Commonwealth v. Hunt,' Tomlins convincingly observes that
Judge Shaw's influential decision, which is best known for redefin-
ing the law of criminal conspiracy in ways that expanded the per-
missible scope of union activities, was actually consistent with the
traditional individualistic emphasis of the common law.'
A. The Transformation of the AFL and the Law in the Early
Twentieth Century
The journeymen's collective interpretation of republicanism,
Tomlins maintains, continued to influence the emerging American
labor movement throughout the nineteenth century. It even influ-
enced Samuel Gompers, the first president of the AFL, whose
name eventually became synonymous with the narrow economic
goals often labelled "bread and butter" or "business" unionism.10
According to Tomlins, Gompers and the AFL fused this version of
republicanism with a newer social democratic collectivism im-
ported from Europe. In responding to judicial attacks on the "coer-
cive" activities of labor unions, Gompers and the AFL frequently
echoed the arguments of their predecessors and defended the asso-
ciational traditions of the labor movement as essential to the eco-
nomic freedom on which republican institutions depend. Gompers
frequently treated attacks on unions as if they were directed
8 45 Mass. 111 (1842).
9 Tomlins accepts the conventional interpretation that, in contrast to earlier decisions
holding combinations of journeymen and strikes unlawful under any conditions, Shaw de-
clared them to be criminal conspiracies only when done for an unlawful purpose. And Shaw
found no unlawful purpose in either the combination or the strike in Hunt. Yet Tomlins
perceptively adds to this legal analysis by drawing on the scholarship of recent labor histori-
ans who have analyzed the transition of labor societies from prerevolutionary corporatist
organizations, requiring membership by all members of a trade, to postrevolutionary volun-
tarist ones. The journeymen in Hunt, Tomlins points out, combined and struck only to
regulate the activities of those who had freely joined their association, rather than to coerce
other journeymen in their trade who had not become members. This distinction between
voluntary and coercive societies, Tomlins persuasively asserts, allowed Shaw to find a lawful
purpose in Hunt without deviating from the individualism of the common law (pp. 40-44).
When unions tried to enforce their associational traditions by regulating work rules and
jurisdictional issues for an entire craft, by contrast, courts routinely found that they had
engaged in illegal "coercion" or "oppression" (pp. 44-51).
10 Other recent labor historians reinforce Tomlins's somewhat revisionist view of
Gompers. See John H. M. Laslett, Samuel Gompers and the Rise of American Business
Unionism, in Melvin Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine, eds., Labor Leaders in America 62
(1987); Nick Salvatore, Introduction to Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor
xi (1984). In his autobiography, id. at 133-34, Gompers himself hints at this transformation
in his thinking.
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against republicanism itself (pp. 32-33, 52, 58-64, 74-75). Yet these
views remained inconsistent with the individualistic common law,
leaving American unions "in a legal twilight zone" (p. 33).
During the decades between 1900 and 1920, unions affiliated
with the AFL largely abandoned the broad social goals of their as-
sociational traditions for a redefined voluntarism that accepted the
reality of corporate capitalism (pp. 61, 74-75, 77). Tomlins, some-
what narrowly, attributes this dramatic change to the decline of
craft unionism and the extension of national controls over local un-
ions (pp. 68-74). Beginning in these years, unions conceded sub-
stantial power to management and sought only to achieve eco-
nomic goals through formal collective bargaining agreements with
employers (pp. 81-82).
Corresponding to this important change within the AFL, the
courts, particularly after World War I, altered their legal treat-
ment of unions. For many years, courts had reasoned that unions,
as voluntary associations, lacked legal personality and could not
enforce trade agreements. But by the 1920s, courts in many juris-
dictions had come to consider unions, like corporations, to be sepa-
rate legal entities distinct from their members, with their own legal
rights and obligations (pp. 83-91). The Norris-LaGuardia Act of
193211 incorporated this developing common law into a federal
statute by allowing unions as organizations to pursue a wide range
of economic activity largely unchecked by legal constraints (pp.
102, 117).
This new recognition of unions as autonomous legal entities,
Tomlins claims, lasted only until the NLRA transformed American
labor law by giving a central role to the state. After World War I,
especially after the widespread labor unrest of 1919-20, employers
increasingly accepted the necessity of formal labor relations with
their employees. Employers continued, however, to resist relation-
ships with independent unions. Instead, they established and dom-
inated shop committees, employee representation plans, and com-
pany unions. These developments presented a terrible dilemma for
the AFL. The employers' generally successful avoidance of inde-
pendent unions prompted these unions to look to the state for as-
sistance in compelling employers to deal with them. Yet unions
feared the power of the state, which threatened their independence
and had often been exercised against unions and workers in the
past (pp. 91-95).
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982).
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B. The Principle of Majority Rule and the Determination of the
Appropriate Bargaining Unit
Tomlins considers the development of the principle of major-
ity rule by the National Labor Board (NLB), an important prede-
cessor of the NLRB, as the decisive step in the evolution of labor
law and collective bargaining policy during the New Deal. Section
7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),'12 a corner-
stone of New Deal legislation, guaranteed employees the right to
organize and to bargain collectively. Yet neither employers nor the
administrators responsible for enforcing this law accepted the
AFL's interpretation of these guarantees as requiring employers to
bargain with independent unions. The resulting strikes and other
industrial unrest led to the creation of the NLB in August 1933 to
settle disputes under section 7(a). Initially, the NLB limited itself
to mediation, allowing employees themselves to decide how they
would choose their representatives. Extraordinary employer in-
transigence, however, soon prompted the NLB, over the opposition
of its employer members, to establish the principle of majority
rule. This principle required the employer to bargain only with the
representative chosen by the majority of employees in a particular
electorate. Employers could no longer bargain with unions repre-
senting minority groups (pp. 103-15).
The AFL happily endorsed majority rule as an effective
weapon against widespread employer refusals to deal with its affili-
ates. For Tomlins, however, majority rule reintroduced the concept
of a union as a mere agent of the employees it was elected to
represent, a model similar to the one used by the common law in
the nineteenth century to declare various union activities coercive
and oppressive (pp. 115-16, 183-84, 187). Moreover, unions tradi-
tionally had been able to determine for themselves the basis for
seeking (and occasionally obtaining) recognition from an employer.
Customs within a particular trade and mutually accepted jurisdic-
tional divisions often provided the basis for recognition. Some-
times employers recognized unions even when the unions did not
have the majority support of the employees (pp. 118, 237-38).
Majority rule introduced tension between this jurisdictional or
"property" right of unions and the emerging individual or "civil"
right of employees, guaranteed by the state, to determine their
own union representatives. This tension, dormant during the exis-
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 701-12 (enacted in 1933). See generally Bernard Bellush, The Failure of
the NRA (1975).
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tence of the weaker NLB, exploded into conflict after Congress
passed the NLRA and created a new NLRB designed to have
power that its predecessors lacked. When the NLRB began to en-
force majority rule, Tomlins concludes, the union movement lost
substantial control over its own destiny and ceded even the defini-
tion of its legitimacy to the state (pp. 135, 149).
In theory, majority rule does not foreclose a union from choos-
ing the electorate in which it organizes and attempts to win a ma-
jority. But the NLRA gave the new labor board the authority to
determine an appropriate bargaining unit in which to hold the rep-
resentation election. Tomlins frequently implies, moreover, that
the NLRB's power to select the electorate and the political model
of representation inherent in the principle of majority rule are
closely related. Under this view, the individual right of employees
to choose a representative by majority vote is rendered meaning-
less whenever the voting occurs in an artificial electorate (pp. 102,
135).
Tomlins indicates that the NLRB's power to select an appro-
priate bargaining unit, more than the principle of majority rule,
undermined traditional union claims to representation based on
custom and jurisdiction. A bureaucratic arm of the state, not the
union movement itself, now had control over labor organization in
the United States. The AFL and other observers of labor relations
recognized the importance of this change even before the NLRA
became law. Commenting on the the initial version of the NLRA,
Wallace Donham of the Harvard Business School told the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor that selection of an appropri-
ate bargaining unit by the NLRB "means State control over trade
union organizations, jurisdictions, elections; indeed, the death of
trade unionism as we know it" (p. 123).
Union leaders raised analogous concerns. In testimony before
the Senate Committee, they emphasized that government interven-
tion in labor disputes should be limited to ensuring that employers
dealt with independent unions. Specific issues, including determi-
nation of an appropriate bargaining unit, should be worked out in
negotiations between labor and management, not by a government
agency (p. 123). The general counsel of the AFL proposed various
amendments to the bill that would have preserved traditional
union autonomy to determine the structure of the bargaining unit
and even to make closed shop agreements with employers without
a prior demonstration of majority support (pp. 138-39). Despite
their criticisms of the bill, however, unions enthusiastically sup-
ported its passage even when their proposed amendments failed.
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The prospect of collective bargaining enforced by the government,
particularly in industries dominated by recalcitrant employers and
their company unions, overcame union reservations about ceding
power to the state (p. 141).
C. The Impact of the NLRA and the NLRB on the American
Labor Movement
Members and staff of the first NLRB, established by Presi-
dent Roosevelt in 1934 and superseded by a new Board with the
enactment of the NLRA in 1935, vigorously opposed these sug-
gested restrictions on government authority. Chastened by the
weaknesses of the NLB and by their own limited power, they
maintained that a strong and independent administrative agency
was essential to enforce the substantive rights of employees con-
tained in the proposed legislation. The victory of this position in
Congress, Tomlins asserts, meant that the new NLRB would be
able to determine the structure of labor representation in light of
its own interpretation of the proper public policy for labor rela-
tions (pp. 136-40).
According to Tomlins, the new NLRB took full advantage of
this freedom. The majority of its members, he observes, believed
that the main purpose of the NLRA was to remove industrial con-
flict from American life. By substituting rights enforceable at law
for economic struggles between employers and employees, the
agency could achieve industrial peace. The Board's commitment to
"a professional legal discourse," Tomlins insists, "enabled law and
order to penetrate and transform a hitherto closed realm of social
and economic life" (pp. 158-59). Any limitations on NLRB power,
such as deference to traditional union practices for determining
the unit for organization and bargaining, would jeopardize the
Board's responsibility to promote industrial peace.
This interpretation of the NLRA "reconstituted collective bar-
gaining" into a public rather than a private function (p. 147). It
also transformed labor unions from autonomous entities that had
finally obtained legal status to "quasi-public instrumentalities
whose function was to bargain within the parameters of a model of
labor relations defined by a state agency" (p. 147). The customs
that had governed unions' relations with employers, employees,
and each other had become potential impediments to the realiza-
tion of the federal goal of industrial peace (p. 147).
The AFL almost immediately challenged the NLRB's emerg-
ing understanding of its role, particularly in the context of deter-
mining appropriate bargaining units. "Better to fight the antago-
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nisms of the employers against organizations of labor," one AFL
leader argued, than to let the NLRB destroy "the power and the
machinery and the right of labor to settle its own disputes within
itself" (p. 144). The emerging rivalry between the AFL and the in-
surgents who eventually broke away and formed the Committee for
Industrial Organization (CIO) provoked the AFL's most significant
opposition to NLRB policy regarding the appropriate bargaining
unit (pp. 143, 150). Initially, the NLRB stayed out of jurisdictional
disputes between unions affiliated with the AFL, and did not dis-
rupt existing patterns of organization. Yet by 1937, as the AFL and
the CIO both expanded their organizing activities, the NLRB felt
compelled to intervene in contested cases. Limiting itself at first to
disputes between unions affiliated with the competing federations,
the NLRB soon expanded its review to include disputes between
affiliates of the same federation, and it generally gave no weight to
private jurisdictional agreements between unions (pp. 162-64).1s
This NLRB position, Tomlins maintains, underlines the transfor-
mation of unions from autonomous entities with rights of their
own to mere agents of employees selected by an agency of the ad-
ministrative state (pp. 149, 187).
Tomlins concludes that by 1938 the AFL's attack on the
NLRB began to transcend the specific context of its rivalry with
the CIO and to focus on the ideological issues raised by the
Board's threat to its traditions of voluntarism (pp. 150, 160). These
broader concerns surfaced during congressional consideration of
proposed amendments to the NLRA, prepared by the AFL, which
would have restricted the NLRB's discretion to determine bargain-
ing units and to invalidate existing collective bargaining agree-
ments on grounds of public policy (pp. 182-83). During congres-
sional hearings on this proposal, the AFL's general counsel claimed
that when the AFL in 1935 supported legislation intended to force
recalcitrant employers to bargain with independent unions, it had
,S Tomlins perceptively observes that the NLRB's famous decision in Globe Machin-
ery, 3 NLRB 294 (1937), which held that the appropriate bargaining unit was the craft unit
favored by the AFL rather than the industrial unit supported by the CIO, was not the broad
victory for the AFL that many assumed. Although upholding the AFL's position in this
particular case, the NLRB made clear that it retained the power to determine an appropri-
ate unit without regard to traditions of union organization, and that it might in other cir-
cumstances determine an industrial rather than a craft unit to be more appropriate. The
next year the NLRB did just that, despite AFL claims that the majority of employees in a
craft unit within the industrial unit supported the AFL. In his discussion of Globe Machin-
ery, as in his earlier treatment of Commonwealth v. Hunt, Tomlins persuasively argues that
a legal decision perceived to protect the autonomous traditions and activities of unions actu-
ally reinforced legal doctrines hostile to them (pp. 165-68).
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not expected application of the statute to require the labor move-
ment to surrender "its philosophy of 'voluntarism,' its right to reg-
ulate and conduct its own internal affairs, and to maintain or
change its form and structure as it deems wise and proper without
government intrusion" (p. 184). The AFL Executive Committee
claimed that the NLRB was establishing "a principle which organ-
ized labor has opposed for over fifty years, namely dictating by
governmental decree the form of organization a group of workers
shall select" (p. 184).
The vigorous opposition of the NLRB to the AFL's proposal,
Tomlins points out, highlights the Board's conception of the mean-
ing of the NLRA and of its own function in interpreting it. In its
report to the House Committee on Labor, the Board maintained
that "the interest of labor organizations in the outcome of a repre-
sentation proceeding . . . should yield to the superior interest of
the public in the prevention of industrial strife" (p. 187). The
NLRB emphasized the role of the union as an agent of employees
rather than as a possessor of rights, adding that even the rights of
employees to associate freely and select a union as their agent
must be subject to the Board's determination of the general public
interest (p. 187).
The AFL's proposed amendments to the NLRA hardly re-
ceived support from within the union movement. The CIO, which
grew out of opposition to the AFL's traditions of organizing and
which benefited from the NLRB's intervention in jurisdictional
disputes, actively opposed the amendments (p. 187). Even the
AFL's own affiliates attacked them. Not simply concerned that any
changes in the NLRA might lead to more dangerous ones, the AFL
affiliates had begun to accept what the CIO unions had always rec-
ognized-the public ordering enforced by the NLRB had provided
substantial legal support in their disputes with employers. The
metaphysics of voluntarism, however attractive in the abstract,
could not compare with this tangible benefit (pp. 187-95).
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the AFL's
proposed amendments failed. The leadership of the AFL found it-
self isolated within its own ranks. Its attempt to preserve auton-
omy for the labor movement beyond the tentacles of the adminis-
trative state created by the New Deal was, in Tomlins's words,
"the final flourish of a decaying voluntarist ideology" (p. 195).
The unsuccessful attempt by the leadership of the AFL to
amend the NLRA, however, did bring about some organizational
benefits. President Roosevelt hoped to diffuse pressure to amend
the NLRA by appointing William Leiserson, a leading industrial
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pluralist, to the NLRB in 1939. Under Leiserson's influence, the
Board began to develop policies more favorable to the institutional
interests of unions at the expense of the individual rights of em-
ployees. The inability of unions to control the activities of their
members, Tomlins asserts, provided the impetus for this change of
policy. The Board increasingly viewed unions as potential allies in
achieving the goal of industrial peace. Stronger unions, the Board
reasoned, could police and restrain rank-and-file unrest (pp. 198-
99).
Tomlins claims that the NLRB, pursuing its new policy of en-
listing unions in the service of industrial peace, began to accept the
AFL's view that union traditions should determine the structure of
an appropriate bargaining unit (pp. 221-27). The Board's develop-
ment of the "contract bar," which prevented employees from chal-
lenging the majority status of a union even during the extension of
an existing collective bargaining agreement, further supported in-
cumbent unions while restricting the rights of individual employ-
ees to choose their own representatives (p. 233). By limiting the
closed shop contract, the NLRB preserved some protection for the
rights of individual employees. But Tomlins concludes that the
thrust of Board decisions after Leiserson's appointment subordi-
nated employee rights to union interests in order to secure the con-
tractual stability that contributed to industrial peace (p. 237).
Board and court decisions confining the scope of employee
concerted activity protected by the NLRA, Tomlins maintains,
complemented this subordination of individual rights to contrac-
tual stability. Allowing employers to punish spontaneous worker
activity-such as sitdowns, slowdowns, and wildcat strikes-helped
channel workers into more conventional union behavior that would
be more likely to promote industrial peace (pp. 238-43). According
to Tomlins, these developments undermined the basic protections
for individuals guaranteed by the NLRA (p. 243). The organized
labor movement, he emphasizes, did not resist this "thermidor in
employee rights" (p. 241). Even the CIO, despite its early reliance
on militant tactics that the Board and the courts were now declar-
ing unprotected, "had quickly learned to prefer the security which
accompanied institutionalization and bureaucratic routine to the
heady uncertainty of spontaneous rank-and-file action" (p. 242).
Tomlins views the transformation of NLRB policy that dates
from Leiserson's appointment as an accommodation in legal theory
between the innovations of the NLRA and the principles of the
common law that prevailed prior to the Act's passage. Strengthen-
ing the power of unions returned to them some legal rights as enti-
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ties that they had enjoyed under the common law; the Board no
longer treated them simply as agents of employees (p. 237). Tom-
lins concedes that the AFL never fully regained its traditions of
voluntarism (pp. 241-42). But he maintains that the Board's in-
creasing emphasis on the role of unions in promoting industrial
peace through the negotiation of enforceable collective bargaining
agreements again placed the unions in the position of principals,
while reducing the employees to relatively passive and impotent
beneficiaries (p. 237).
For Tomlins, the New Deal was the climax of the history of
labor relations in the United States, and subsequent developments
have been merely the predictable denouement. He interprets the
Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA,1' passed by a Republican
Congress in 1947 over President Truman's veto, as an extension of
the collective bargaining policy of the New Deal-not as the reac-
tionary break with the past that many have perceived them to be
(pp. 250-51, 280-81, 299).15 Although conservative members of
Congress and business groups tried to repeal the NLRA (pp. 247-
50), Tomlins insists that the Taft-Hartley Amendments did not ac-
complish what these conservatives wanted. In large part, the
amendments simply transposed prior NLRB decisions into legisla-
tion. To the extent that the amendments seemed to alter the
NLRA, the Board was generally able to neutralize them through
subsequent weakening interpretations (p. 285). Tomlins concedes
that several amendments, including those outlawing jurisdictional
strikes and secondary boycotts, confined unions more strictly
within existing collective bargaining structures and prevented
them from penetrating additional aspects of the employment rela-
tionship. But in his view, these admittedly severe restrictions ena-
bled the Taft-Hartley Amendments to entrench rather than to dis-
rupt the pluralist model of stable collective bargaining as the road
to industrial peace (pp. 299-300, 303-04). Subsequent NLRB and
court decisions, Tomlins concludes, only furthered this process
(pp. 304-26).
III. A CRITIQUE
Tomlins's provocative account of the relations between the
14 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1982).
As Tomlins acknowledges, other scholars have recognized this continuity. See, e.g.,
Arthur McClure, The Truman Administration and the Problems of Postwar Labor, 1945-48
at 242 (1969); Philip Ross, The Government as a Source of Union Power 148 (1965); Clyde
W. Summers, Politics, Policy Making and the NLRB, 6 Syracuse L. Rev. 93, 99-100 (1954).
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state and the unions itself raises several basic questions about his
conclusions. Tomlins focuses on the collective bargaining policy of
the New Deal, and particularly on the role of the NLRA in condi-
tioning the legitimacy of labor activity. But his description of the
transformation of organized labor between 1900 and 1920 from an
ambitious social movement to a narrow economic one seems much
more significant. Imbued with the broad collective values amalga-
mated from its republican traditions and European social demo-
cratic thought, the AFL as late as the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury saw itself as the means by which labor would transform
society. By the 1920s, however, it had accepted corporate capital-
ism and had limited itself to a redefined voluntarism that sought,
through collective bargaining agreements with employers, to obtain
greater economic benefits for employees. The dramatic constriction
of labor's own purposes in the early twentieth century, probably
influenced by a hostile judiciary and the use of police and military
power against the collective activities of workers,1" overshadows
whatever role the state may have had later in limiting the efforts of
unions and workers to achieve their goals. Thus, Tomlins's own ev-
idence indicates that subsequent legal developments during the
New Deal were significantly less important than he maintains, and
that the current position of labor must be traced to its own inter-
nal development as well as to the intervention of the state.
Even with respect to the New Deal period on which he concen-
trates, Tomlins makes somewhat inconsistent arguments. In dis-
cussing NLRB decisions in the years immediately following the
passage of the NLRA, Tomlins bemoans the decline of labor volun-
tarism at the hands of the administrative state. In legal terms, un-
ions lost the status they had finally won as autonomous entities
with legal rights of their own and became reduced to mere agents
of the employees they represented. The triumph of the civil rights
of individual employees over the jurisdictional or property rights of
unions, Tomlins suggests, made the achievement of labor goals less
likely. When he discusses NLRB decisions after the appointment
of Leiserson in 1939, however, Tomlins reverses his complaint. He
faults the NLRB for entrenching unions at the expense of the indi-
6 1 am grateful to William Forbath for directing my attention to the hostile state as an
important factor in understanding the constriction of labor's goals. Tomlins himself hints at
but does not develop this point (pp. 60-61). See Laslett, Samuel Gompers, in Dubofsky and
Van Tine, eds., Labor Leaders at 82 (cited in note 10) (labor defeats resulting from govern-
ment intervention on behalf of employers taught Gompers that accommodations with em-
ployers must be made at the workplace).
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vidual rights of employees that lie at the core of the NLRA.
Tomlins cannot have it both ways. As his own book repeatedly
illustrates, the collective strength of unions requires some restric-
tions on the individual rights of workers. There are many possible
ways to balance collective and individual interests, but in any ac-
commodation something must give. Rather than confront this is-
sue, Tomlins simply objects to virtually everything the Board did.
Tomlins does, of course, have an underlying objection to all
Board and court decisions interpreting the NLRA. Whatever legal
theory they used, Tomlins maintains, these decisions were guided
by the view that Congress passed the NLRA primarily to promote
the public policy of industrial peace. This public policy is the con-
stant villain of The State and the Unions. The promotion of in-
dustrial peace through law, according to Tomlins, aids productivity
and capital accumulation while suppressing more voluntary and
militant actions by which workers are better able to achieve their
own interests. In allocating power between unions and individual
employees, Tomlins apparently approves the balance that would
favor his view of a better society. Tomlins is less interested in the
legal issue of whether a union should be treated as a legal entity or
as an agent of employees than in the practical issue of whether
unions or individual employees are more likely to challenge the ex-
isting economic and political order, an issue he never really
resolves.
Tomlins would have been more convincing had he confronted
more directly the Board's consistently conservative interpretation
of the Act's purposes. Tomlins implies that other constructions of
the NLRA were not available in the 1930s. Yet the introductory
"findings and policies" of the NLRA stress not only the impor-
tance of "removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife
and unrest," but also the goal of "restoring equality of bargaining
power between employers and employees. ' 17 Nor does Tomlins ex-
plore the possibility that the two consecutive legal rationales used
by the Board, while inconsistent with each other, had progressive
as well as conservative implications. State enforcement of the indi-
vidual rights of employees against the power of their unions could
encourage rank-and-file militancy, just as state support of powerful
unions at the expense of some individual rights could strengthen
labor opposition to powerful employers. Would either employees or
unions have taken advantage of these opportunities had they been
127 29 U.S.C. § 151.
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presented? Given the significance he attributes to the New Deal as
a crucial turning point in American labor history and his dismay at
the subsequent course of labor relations in the United States, it
would have been interesting for Tomlins to have reflected about
whether alternative roads might have been taken during the 1930s.
Substantial evidence, moreover, undermines Tomlins's basic
assertion that the public policy of industrial peace was the funda-
mental factor guiding Board decisions on majority rule and unit
determinations. Staff members of the original NLRB thought that
their primary objective in adopting majority rule was to strengthen
weak unions rather than to achieve stability. Thomas Emerson,
who was an attorney on the NLRB staff, maintained that the de-
velopment of majority rule must be understood as a response to a
situation in which "unions as a whole were in a very inferior, weak,
and rather precarious position," industry was largely antiunion,
"and the whole idea of the legitimacy of a union representing em-
ployees was not accepted." In these circumstances, Emerson ar-
gued, "it became even more necessary to subordinate whatever
rights of the individual might be involved to the rights of the
union."' 8 Similar considerations led many on the staff of the Board
to favor large industrial over small craft bargaining units. Allowing
more than one unit in a single plant or company, they feared,
would encourage minority groups to seek recognition and endanger
majority rule, thereby undermining "labor solidarity."' 9
Tomlins accurately describes the tendency of the NLRB after
the appointment of Leiserson to support union interests in stable
collective bargaining relationships and to deny protection to vari-
ous forms of concerted activity by individual employees. But he
may have overstated the extent to which these developments serve
as evidence of the legal pacification of American labor. One scholar
of labor relations in the 1940s persuasively concludes that manag-
ers, though bothered by wildcat strikes and other militant rank-
and-file attempts at control in the workplace, were much more
concerned about the threat to their prerogatives from the orderly
process of collective bargaining with bureaucratic unions."0
In revealing the dangers of labor's reliance on the state, Tom-
lins seems to romanticize the lost potential of AFL voluntarism,
even as redefined simply to seek better economic benefits for work-
ers within the accepted structure of corporate capitalism. It is un-
18 James A. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board 96 (1974).
" Id. at 98-99.
20 Howell John Harris, The Right to Manage 67 (1982).
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clear how progressive a force the AFL would have been in the
1930s had the law not restricted its traditional methods of organi-
zation by imposing majority rule and administrative determina-
tions of bargaining units. Most labor historians consider the insur-
gents in the CIO who broke away from the timid leadership of the
AFL to be the real labor progressives of the 1930s. The CIO, with
the substantial assistance of NLRB rulings declaring industrial
rather than craft units to be appropriate bargaining units, organ-
ized vast numbers of industrial employees previously ignored by
the AFL.2 1 Indeed, many staff members of the NLRB considered
the AFL to be the "company union" of the 1930s because it at-
tempted, often successfully, to convince employers to recognize it
as an alternative to the allegedly communist and radical CIO.22 As
the Chairman of the NLRB bluntly told the AFL convention in
1937, the NLRA did not mean that "it shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to coerce his employees to join a union
unless he coerces them to join an American Federation of Labor
Union. ' 23 And the AFL, as part of its efforts to restrict the power
of the NLRB through amendments to the NLRA, entered into alli-
ances with both employers and conservative members of
Congress. 24
Tomlins accurately observes that unions accepted the ac-
knowledged risks of state intervention in labor relations not just in
1934 and 1935, when the NLRA was first debated and passed, but
in 1939, when some of these risks had become realities. Most union
leaders, Tomlins concedes, were willing to exchange voluntarism
for the advantages of legal enforcement of the rights to organize
and bargain collectively. However, unlike other labor historians
who share his view that the New Deal collective bargaining policy
fostered government intervention and public accountability that
21 See, e.g., Irving Bernstein, A History of the American Worker: Turbulent Years 432-
634, 653-56 (1970); Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL 610-15 (1960); Robert
H. Zieger, American Workers, American Unions, 1920-1985 at 41-55 (1986). Although Tom-
lins has effectively argued that the AFL's role as a progressive force in the 1930s has been
underestimated, he concedes that the CIO organized the predominantly semiskilled and un-
skilled workers in the mass production industries, where the AFL had a record of vacillation
and failure. Christopher L. Tomlins, AFL Unions in the 1930s: Their Performance in His-
torical Perspective, 65 J. Am. Hist. 1021, 1033-34 (1979).
22 Gross, Making of the NLRB at 248 (cited in note 18).
23 Id. at 250.
24 James A. Gross, The Reshaping of the National Labor Relations Board 67-68, 75-76,
108 (1981). According to Gross, these alliances continued even after the AFL bad regained
the initiative in its conflict with the CIO. Id. at 263.
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restricted the scope of union and worker activity,"5 Tomlins refuses
to recognize that the new role of the law introduced by the NLRA
was liberating as well as cooptive.
The vigorous enforcement of the NLRA in the 1930s helped
unions organize the very industries that had successfully resisted
them in the past.2 6 The NLRB's orders in unfair labor practice
cases, especially those requiring reinstatement and back pay to em-
ployees discharged for union activities, alleviated worker fears of
discrimination by employers. The Board effectively eliminated the
company unions that had plagued the organized labor movement
before the enactment of the NLRA. Tomlins's preference for spon-
taneous action notwithstanding, the orderly procedures of the
NLRA helped unions avoid the often suicidal organizational strikes
that had previously crippled them.2 7 Furthermore, the contractual
stability that Tomlins disparages provided legally enforceable rules
limiting arbitrary employer actions and protecting job seniority.28
Union leaders were not as misguided as Tomlins suggests in their
acceptance of admittedly flawed state intervention. Tomlins is per-
suasive in attacking the paean to American labor relations popu-
larized by the industrial pluralists. But he is unconvincing when he
concludes his book by asserting unequivocally that "a counterfeit
liberty is the most that American workers and their organizations
have been able to gain through the state" (p. 328).9
Tomlins continues his one-sided approach in his discussion of
,5 See David Montgomery, Workers' Control in America 165 (1979); David Brody,
Workers in Industrial America 143-44 (1980).
2 Montgomery, Workers' Control at 165 (cited in note 25).
27 Brody, Workers in Industrial America at 100-02 (cited in note 25).
8 Montgomery, Workers' Control at 156, 165 (cited in note 25); Zieger, American
Workers at 157-58 (cited in note 21).
29 A provocative essay by the great English scholar, R. H. Tawney, stands in fascinat-
ing contrast to Tomlins's analysis. R. H. Tawney, The American Labor Movement and
Other Essays (J. M. Winter ed. 1979). Tawney, like Tomlins, concluded that through pas-
sage of the NLRA the American labor movement had become "the creation of the State."
Id. at 17. Yet Tawney maintained that the "sensational importance" of the NLRA, id. at 11,
lay in its assumptions that the previous "industrial autocracy" must cease and that the
resources of the state must be available to compel employers to deal in good faith with
unions freely elected by workers. Id. at 13-14. Tawney also characterized the achievements
of the CIO, which were assisted by the state, as the most significant contribution to eco-
nomic freedom in the United States since the founding of the AFL. Id. at 81-82. According
to Tawney, the CI0 represented "a departure, not only from the less desirable practices of
business trade unionism, but from its depressing propensity to mental stagnation." Id. at 83.
The AFL's commitment to traditional jurisdictional practices, which Tomlins perceives as a
heroic assertion of labor voluntarism, was for Tawney an archaic invocation of property and
contractual rights that prevented effective organization and exhibited the "stiffness in the
joints" from which the AFL suffered. Id. at 27-30.
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legal developments since the New Deal. He presents only cases
that restricted the rights of unions and workers. For example,
Tomlins mentions a Supreme Court decision that allowed employ-
ers to refuse to bargain about subjects "at the core of en-
trepreneurial control" (pp. 319-20)3 0 without even indicating that
the courts, over vociferous employer objections, previously had ex-
panded the mandatory subjects of bargaining to include medical
and insurance benefits and pensions."1 He also gives the misleading
impression that all legal decisions promoted industrial peace in a
variety of ways, from repressing many forms of concerted action to
favoring stability in collective bargaining agreements whose provi-
sions covered only a narrow range of issues. While he emphasizes
Supreme Court holdings that restricted the right to strike over ar-
bitrable matters (p. 321),32 Tomlins ignores another important de-
cision requiring employers to bargain with unions even when their
members are engaging in unprotected slowdowns.3 3 Surely this de-
cision does not reveal an unbending adherence to the goal of indus-
trial peace.
Many decisions by the NLRB and the courts, of course, did
not favor worker or union interests. Tomlins frequently seems to
suggest that these decisions represent the inevitable outcome of le-
gal intervention in labor relations. But both mainstream and radi-
cal scholars of labor law have argued, often persuasively, that a
large number of these decisions were not compelled by the NLRA
and could have been decided differently within standard modes of
legal analysis. Indeed, one of the most influential works by any
radical scholar of labor law refers in its title to the "judicial deradi-
calization" of the NLRA that undermined the Act's liberating po-
tential.3 4 Tomlins indicates in his bibliography that he has been
influenced by this scholarship (p. 336), but he never confronts its
challenge to his own conclusions.
Tomlins not only underestimates the benefits of law for the
labor movement; he also exaggerates law's importance as an expla-
nation for the current weaknesses of organized labor. Law may
have had a significant role in limiting the horizons of workers, par-
ticularly as the early doctrines announced by the NLRB and the
30 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
3 See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948). See also Zieger,
American Workers at 150 (cited in note 21).
3'2 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
33 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
34 Klare, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (cited in note 6). See also Atleson, Values and Assump-
tions (cited in note 6).
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courts gained the authority of tradition. Yet by narrowing his anal-
ysis to the legal triumph of industrial pluralism in the decades fol-
lowing the New Deal, Tomlins implies that state intervention
through the NLRA has been the primary, if not the exclusive,
cause of labor's decline. This implication cannot withstand
analysis.
In many respects, unions and workers have allowed law to play
a greater role than the NLRA or its subsequent legal interpretation
required. For example, judicial decisions precluding strikes over
grievances designated as arbitrable by a collective bargaining
agreement, on which Tomlins places so much emphasis (pp. 320-
22), do not require unions and employers to negotiate agreements
that make grievances arbitrable. Arbitration limits both the
worker's right to strike and management's authority to decide uni-
laterally. Unions can reserve the right to strike over mandatory
subjects if they do not agree to submit grievances over these sub-
jects to arbitration. Yet pressure for arbitration historically has
come more from unions eager to limit managerial discretion than
from managers eager to obtain labor peace. To some extent, unions
and employers share an interest in restraining rank-and-file mili-
tancy through expansive arbitration clauses. But in many in-
stances, even militant workers have supported collective bargain-
ing agreements that voluntarily extend the rule of law to the
workplace beyond anything required by the NLRA or the Board's
interpretations of it. These workers have wanted better collective
bargaining agreements, not restrictions on their scope. They them-
selves have often supported the rule of law that arguably has re-
stricted their own power3
The fact that unions and workers make conscious choices
about the issues over which to strike provides more evidence that
decisions within the labor movement, and not simply restraints im-
posed by the law, account for developments in industrial relations.
Contrary to the impression left by Tomlins, there has been no sig-
nificant reduction in the number of strikes in the United States
during recent decades.36 Workers have struck over pension and
health plans, the speed of the assembly line, work standards, and
job assignments. They even have engaged in illegal wildcat strikes
and in other unprotected activities over these issues. But they have
been reluctant to use the strike weapon to attack managerial pre-
rogatives more remote from their immediate economic and working
" See Brody, Workers in Industrial America at 201-11 (cited in note 25).
" Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 218 (1984).
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interests. 37
Union negotiating tactics, which Tomlins does not discuss, re-
veal even more clearly the importance of nonlegal factors within
the labor movement itself in understanding contemporary labor re-
lations. Only months after the end of World War II, labor lead-
ers-most notably Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers
(UAW)-advocated an expansion of the scope of collective bar-
gaining to include topics such as subcontracting, technological
change, plant location, and company financial policies that argua-
bly related to wages. At a conference of labor and management in-
tended to promote industrial peace, the union representatives re-
fused to concede any specific function as a managerial prerogative.
Managers saw the specter of socialism.
A strike against General Motors in late 1945 brought these is-
sues to a head. Reuther demanded that General Motors open its
books so that the union could prove that the company would be
able to give a 30 percent wage increase without raising its prices.
Management felt that this demand constituted an unacceptable at-
tack on the company's fundamental managerial prerogative to es-
tablish prices. To a member of the UAW staff, by contrast, the
strike seemed "the first act of a new and significant era .. .in
which labor might break away from the bonds of business union-
ism, to wage an economic struggle planned to advance the welfare
of the community as a whole, and to lay the foundations for new
economic mechanisms designed to win security without sacrificing
liberty."3 " This language recalls the collective vision of republican-
ism that the redefined voluntarism of the AFL had superseded in
the early twentieth century.
This vision, however, never materialized, and the law had little
to do with the outcome. General Motors suffered through an ex-
pensive 113-day strike to preserve its managerial prerogatives. It
offered the union an attractive financial package, but refused to
budge on disclosing information and bargaining about prices.
Faced with this choice, the union took the money. No other union
attempted a similarly ambitious bargaining strategy; they all chose
monetary benefits over redistribution of power and industrial de-
mocracy. Even Reuther himself never again challenged such a ba-
sic management prerogative.3 9
'7 Zieger, American Workers at 150-55 (cited in note 21); Brody, Workers in Industrial
America at 194-95 (cited in note 25).
38 Brody, Workers in Industrial America at 176 (cited in note 25).
' Id. at 175-91. See also Nelson Lichtenstein, Walter Reuther and the Rise of Labor-
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The new subjects over which unions did insist on bargaining
after the war-such as pensions, health benefits, and other welfare
issues-emphasized that they were interested in guaranteeing the
security of their members, and not in participating in the determi-
nation of broader company policies that might ultimately affect
workers.40 Most union bargaining demands remained focused on
workplace concerns. Even with respect to these central interests,
unions wanted only to negotiate rules. Unions preferred policing
management's enforcement of the rules to administering them
jointly.41 The relative absence of pressures on unions from their
members throughout the late 1940s and 1950s suggests that they
supported, or at least did not oppose, the policies of their unions.42
Tomlins's exclusive focus on the NLRA as the explanation for
the current status of the American labor movement ignores many
other important nonlegal issues. The position of American workers
derives at least in part from their involvement in social and politi-
cal movements that have repercussions beyond the workplace. For
example, large numbers of union members voted for Eisenhower in
the 1950s and for Reagan in the 1980s. Union leaders eagerly par-
ticipated in the cold war policies of the 1950s, aiding the State De-
partment in overthrowing leftist governments abroad and purging
the unions' own radical members. Two decades later the AFL-CIO
leadership supported American participation in the war in Viet-
nam while many of its former allies led the increasingly powerful
antiwar movement. Since World War II, the AFL-CIO helped elect
Democrats to Congress and supported progressive social legislation
dealing with civil rights, social security, health care, and low-in-
come housing. Though it has been less successful in obtaining leg-
islation of more immediate benefit to workers and unions, organ-
ized labor was instrumental in passing laws that prohibit
employment discrimination, protect occupational safety and
health, secure pension reform, and limit the impact of bankruptcy
on collective bargaining agreements. A new workplace militancy
arose among a younger generation of American workers in the late
1960s and early 1970s, at the same time that many of their con-
temporaries became involved in the black power and antiwar
movements (and that many radical scholars reached political and
Liberalism, in Dubofsky and Van Tine, eds., Labor Leaders at 280, 289-94 (cited in note 10).
40 Brody, Workers in Industrial America at 192-95 (cited in note 25).
41 Harris, The Right to Manage at 70-71 (cited in note 20).
42 Id. at 156; Zieger, American Workers at 139 (cited in note 21).
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intellectual consciousness)."3
These examples undercut Tomlins's implication that the
"state" and the "law" sapped the activism of American unions and
workers. They also demonstrate that American labor has not been
reduced to any specific ideology. Even if its traditions of volunta-
rism had withstood the onslaught of the state better than Tomlins
perceives, the radical reshaping of society that he longs for might
not have come to pass. In any event, these nonlegal events cry out
for explanations that Tomlins's legal analysis cannot provide.
CONCLUSION
Had Tomlins been a bit more modest in his aims and a bit
more cautious in his conclusions, it would not be fair to criticize
him for neglecting nonlegal factors that influence contemporary
American labor relations. The State and the Unions makes enor-
mous contributions to scholarship in labor history and labor law by
creatively integrating work in these related fields. It helps readers
reevaluate the crucial developments of the New Deal by contrast-
ing them with earlier traditions and by discussing previously un-
known and extremely important sources that reveal ideologies and
strategies within the AFL and the NLRB. Harnessing original find-
ings to sophisticated theoretical analysis, Tomlins is able to
demonstrate, particularly in the context of unit determinations by
the NLRB, the costs of labor's reliance on the state and its laws. In
the process, he persuasively challenges the theory of industrial plu-
ralism that has smugly exaggerated the effectiveness of American
labor law and industrial relations. And for many readers on the
left, his historical discussion of labor's republican traditions will
provide an attractive alternative to the current union movement.
Unfortunately, Tomlins was not content with these remarka-
ble achievements. Appropriately convinced of the importance of
law, which has a strong grip on American unions and workers, he
exaggerates its capacity for evil and unconvincingly elevates its sig-
nificance into the major, if not the only, explanation for the con-
temporary position of American labor. The NLRA cannot bear the
interpretive burdens Tomlins places on it. Additional factors, par-
ticularly the activities and ideologies of workers and unions, must
also be appreciated, even to understand the role the law might
have had in shaping them. Building on Tomlins's refutation of the
43 For an account of most of these developments, see generally Zieger, American Work-
ers (cited in note 21).
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tradition of industrial pluralism, others should seek to reveal more
fully the function of law in the wider world of labor. Even when it
disappoints, The State and the Unions helps set the agenda for
future scholarship.
